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Conflict Quarterly 
State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Mode of Diplomacy?* 
by 
Noemi Gal-Or 
And, I believe that the principles of sound diplomacy, which are 
immutable, will in the end prevail, and thus calm the chaos with which 
the transition between the old diplomacy and the new has for the 
moment bewildered the world.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Paraphrasing Clemenceau's aphorism that war is too important to be left to 
the generals, one might say that state-sponsored terrorism, a fortiori, is too 
intangible to be left to the generals. But should it be handed over to the diplomats? 
This question summarizes the main concern of this article, which consists 
primarily in a pre-theoretical discourse on definitions. The purpose of the study is 
to suggest an alternative understanding of the role and the nature of state-sponsored 
terrorism in foreign policy and, by extension, in international relations. Unlike the 
perception prevailing among most students of state-sponsored terrorism, i.e. that it 
is a form of low-intensity warfare, this paper maintains that this strategy and activity 
belong to the diplomatic side of the continuum of war and diplomacy. More often 
than not, state-sponsored terrorism is a form of diplomatic bargaining and not of 
war.2 If this contention proves sensible, a revision of the explanation of the nature 
of diplomacy will be inevitable. At this stage, however, I will contend with the 
modest effort of raising the issue for discussion and offering some suggestions. 
Before embarking on the main course of the study, some preliminary remarks 
of a delineative nature are necessary. Harry Eckstein's insightful comments about 
the difficulties encountered when discussing internal war for the first time offer 
support as well as advice in regard to the study of state-sponsored terrorism and 
diplomacy. Eckstein stresses two problems concerning the delimitation of theoreti-
cal subjects in general, and internal war in particular: the difficulty in finding a 
homogeneous set of cases, and the problem of limiting the degree of homogeneity 
when making delicate distinctions.3 As will be seen later, these hurdles are clearly 
manifest when defining terrorism, state terrorism, war, and diplomacy. Associated 
with the constraints of delimitation is the challenge of formulating generalizations. 
Often, a developed generalization will tend to be too broad and consequently offset 
the original delimitation. Classification will be useful here in providing for the 
consideration of atypical cases. It will thus permit deviation from the rules 
identified in the generalization.4 
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SOME GENERAL REFLECTIONS 
Present-day terrorism has become commonplace in modern life on both the 
national-domestic and the international levels. Its modernity lies in evoking a direct 
sensational involvement in political matters in a way reminiscent of the emotional 
reaction of people to major crises like war or natural disasters. The occasional 
success of terrorist methods in diverting governments from previously planned 
policies; its function in altering politics; and the manipulation of politics, particu-
larly in open societies where free interaction between the public and the ruling 
authorities prevails, have lured governments into adopting terrorism as a means of 
affecting other governments' policies. 
The Iraqi hostage-taking preceding the 1991 Gulf War is a recent and 
conspicuous example of the use of state-sponsored terrorism for foreign policy 
purposes. It differs from earlier and similar events,5 mainly in its direct and open 
defiance of the customs and rules of international relations pertaining to both 
peace and war. It differs also in terms of scale: tens of thousands of people 
being held as hostages rather than just a few dozen. In this way, Iraqi behavior has 
exposed a practice which during the 1980s (if not the 1970s also) has been concealed 
and denied. 
Since the beginning of human history, clandestine violence and assassination 
have been used as means of furthering governmental objectives and the potential of 
modern terrorism appears to have become a convenient addition to this arsenal. In 
a gradual process prevailing traditional rules of permission and prohibition, which 
ruled out terrorism-like practices, have increasingly been pushed aside to make 
room for state-sponsored and/or state-initiated terrorist organizations and activities. 
Examples of this mode of violence were found in the practice of the German 
Democratic Republic, South Yemen, Libya, Syria, Cuba, but also in Israel, the US 
and the USSR (to mention only a few). Thus, in some cases, terrorism has become 
an element of governmental foreign policy.6 
Interestingly, governments of states affected by state-sponsored terrorism 
have also developed a special attitude toward the phenomenon. Unable to counter 
terrorism effectively, they have at times preferred to benefit from their "victimiza-
tion" by upgrading terrorism into a major issue on both their domestic policy agenda 
and in foreign affairs. Consequently, being targeted by terrorism has become 
useful as a propagandist tool to influence public opinion at home and/or to foster the 
state's foreign-policy position against its adversaries (for example, Israel versus the 
Arab states and the Palestinians, and the US versus the Soviet Union, Cuba and the 
Arab states). 
Terrorism, and state-sponsored terrorism in particular, are conceptualized in 
both the legal and social scientific disciplines as types of violent behavior. And 
reviewing the literature on terrorism reveals that state-sponsored terrorism, like 
terrorism in general, is referred to in traditional terms: either as a kind of crime, or 
as warfare (mostly low-intensity and unconventional), or as both. Such a limited 
focus fails to understand the phenomenon in its entirety, and overlooks the 
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particular nuances of state-sponsored terrorism. To fix the scope more definitely, 
alternative paradigms (to crime and war) are desired which would propose either 
new concepts or invest old ones (i.e. state terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, state 
initiated terrorism, terrorism, etc.) with clear content and develop unambiguous 
semantic distinctions, such as, perhaps, terrorist diplomacy versus terrorist warfare. 
Two major issues must be considered. First is the delineation of the political 
area of action of state-sponsored terrorism. While it is generally agreed that state-
sponsored terrorism is an instrument of foreign policy, ambiguity still governs 
attempts to discern where and when it actually becomes part of foreign policy. 
Should the elimination of hostile nationals on foreign territory, when involving 
random casualties, be considered state-sponsored terrorism? Does the involvement 
of terrorism in drug trafficking make the drug trading state an accomplice and 
consequently a terrorism sponsoring state? 
The second issue resides in evaluating the kind of instrument of foreign 
policy state-sponsored terrorism represents. Being unclear about whether state-
sponsored terrorism should be considered an act of war, but nevertheless leaning 
toward such approach, politicians and commentators in conflict resolution were 
inclined to search for the answer by focusing on the response to state-sponsored 
terrorism. And in the absence of a feasible and effective reply to state-sponsored 
terrorism political experience and the terrorism literature have suggested a clear 
preference for diplomatic negotiations over the exchange of violence.7 Such an 
inclination leads to the conclusion that an alternative to the perception of state-
sponsored terrorism as an act of war, namely state-sponsored terrorism as diplo-
macy, deserves at least serious consideration. 
Clearly, the conclusion deriving from the gap between theory and practice 
renders rethinking state-sponsored terrorism imperative. As a prolegomenon this 
study will suggest an alternative frame of reference, i.e. to perceive state-sponsored 
terrorism, under certain conditions, as a means of diplomacy. Such an approach will 
hopefully extract the discussion from its current impasse by raising new questions 
and highlighting the phenomenon from a different angle. 
DEFINING STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM 
The pitfalls besetting any attempt to define terrorism are illustrated by Keith 
Highet's remark that "the proscribed act of 'terrorism' is hard to define, but — like 
pornography — you know it when you see it."8 Indeed, what had previously been 
rejected by scholars of terrorism has since become conventional wisdom: almost 
everybody familiar with the study of terrorism admits that no commonly agreed 
definition exists. Support can be found in the fact that international conventions and 
bi-national treaties dealing with terrorism have so far abstained from defining it.9 
Instead of plunging anew into this "quagmire," it appears preferable to concentrate 
solely on the characterization of state-sponsored terrorism.10 
Basically, there are two approaches to defining state-sponsored terrorism. 
The maximalist approach, represented mainly in Michael Stohl's" writings, ex-
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tends the discussion to include acts of terror carried out against the indigenous 
population. The minimalist approach, reflected in the American Society of 
International Law's Report of the Committee on the Responses to State-Sponsored 
Terrorism, limits the discussion to terrorism directed against foreigners. Andrew 
Selth represents a third variation which is however closer to the minimalist 
approach.12 
The Maximalist Approach 
In an effort to establish the fine line distinguishing acts of terrorism by the 
state from other violent, but non-terrorist state-executed activities that are carried 
out by state organs, Stohl and Lopez assert that albeit difficult, 
. . . it is essential to demarcate among the forms of state-directed 
political violence, especially oppression, repression, and terrorism.. 
.. In light of these differentiations, terrorism is the purposeful act or 
threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim 
and/or audience [sic] of the act or threat.13 
The American Heritage Dictionary especially emphasizes that terrorism is 
"a system of government that uses terror to rule."14 Adopting this qualification, the 
important impact of terrorism is that which is exerted on an audience rather than on 
the direct victim. Clearly, so broad a definition fails to distinguish between state 
terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism.15 It includes in state-sponsored terrorism 
as well as in state terrorism practices such as death squad activity — when sponsored 
or supported by a third state — and covert action. 
Stohl proceeds to elaborate on the international dimensions of state terror-
ism. State terrorism, under certain conditions here referred to as state-sponsored 
terrorism, has three different international manifestations. Coercive diplomacy is 
state terrorism that attempts "to make noncompliance with a particular political 
demand . . . 'terrible beyond endurance'."16 Covert behavior is state terrorism 
which, contrary to the overt character of coercive diplomacy, consists of intimida-
tion or destabilization of foreign actors (either states or their societies) by types of 
violence characteristic of terrorism. Surrogate terrorism is "assistance to another 
state or insurgent organization... [in an effort to improve] the capability ofthat actor 
to practice terrorism."17 
Evidently, covert action and the use of death squads are also referred to as 
methods to be included within the category of state-terrorism and state-sponsored 
terrorism. A clarification of these concepts is therefore in place here. David Mason 
and Dale Krane define the term "death squad" as: 
Those military, paramilitary, and irregular units that engage in violent 
acts against a population in order to deter them from lending support 
to opposition groups. 'Death squad violence' is repressive violence 
intended to induce compliance through fear. It may be employed 
reactively or proactively. Its most critical distinguishing feature is 
10 
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that it is violence sanctioned by the regime, either explicitly through 
policy announcements or implicitly through lack of effort to curtail 
such acts.18 
Covert action is a much broader category which, under certain circum-
stances, may also include support of death squad policies by other governments. 
According to Loch Johnson, '"covert action' is a phrase used to identify the pursuit 
of American foreign policy objectives through secret intervention in the affairs of 
other nations."19 He distinguishes four categories of covert action: propaganda, 
political, economic and paramilitary.20 As far as terrorism is concerned, however, 
the paramilitary aspect only infrequently involves the murder of individual en-
emies. In CIA terminology such assassinations belong under the label of "executive 
action" or "termination with extreme prejudice."21 The above-mentioned methods 
of covert action share the same aim as terrorism: (further) destabilization in the 
target country, usually accompanied by the intimidation of the population, even in 
cases where the targets are deliberately chosen and do not randomly affect innocent 
civilians. 
How does state-sponsorship of terrorism relate to the violent aspect of covert 
action, death squads and state-terrorism? All the methods reviewed so far are directed 
at intimidating and terrorizing randomly targeted innocent people by the employment 
of violence. But it is the international link that renders them part of state-sponsored 
terrorism. The fact that a third party is involved in the terrorist relationship between 
local government and the local population is the decisive criterion. According to the 
maximahst approach, both covert actions and the support of governments by means of 
death squads are to be included in the list. Examples are, to name a few, US intervention 
abroad, notably in Latin America; South African intervention in Angola; the Soviet 
intervention in the Middle East and Western Europe; Iranian, Israeli, Syrian and Libyan 
intervention in Lebanon and Western Europe. 
The Minimalist Approach 
The minimalist approach to state-sponsored terrorism is also conservative in 
nature. The Report of the Committee on the Responses to State-Sponsored Terrorism 
suggests that: 
. . . State involvement in international terrorism may be classified into 
two basic categories: state support and state sponsorship. Under this 
classification 'state sponsorship' would be limited to those situations 
where the state contributes active planning, direction and control to 
terrorist operations. State sponsorship, then, would include the use of 
state intelligence operatives to carry out terrorist acts in foreign 
countries — the most active form of state involvement — as well as 
planning for and guidance of terrorist operations carried out by non-
state actors. In planning the state is directly involved in the develop-
ment of programs of action, and these programs may be long term or 
short term, i.e. plans for a single, immediate action.22 
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State support of terrorism includes the provision of transportation, permis-
sion to use the state's territory for terrorist purposes, financial support, training and 
equipping, military, and rhetorical support (which according to Johnson qualifies 
as the other element of covert action, indirectly linked also to terrorism).23 
The Committee admits that only a thin line separates state sponsorship or 
state support of terrorism from other forms of violence such as insurgency. The 
distinction — and this is important to note — is not over the type of training 
provided, but rather the purposes for which the training is provided.24 Unfortu-
nately, the Committee did not pursue this delicate issue and were content with the 
examination of legal constraints on, and prohibitions of unfriendly and aggressive 
acts among, states which may include also terrorism.25 
Be it the maximalist or the minimalist approach, concentrating on the 
particular purposes of sponsoring terrorism is bound to lead to a dead-end. In the 
search for remedies and means of reducing the propensity of states to resort to 
terrorism, an outlook distinguishing between "good guys" and "bad guys" undoubt-
edly distorts the picture. Certainly, there exist differences between kinds of state 
sponsorship of terrorism, but these are rather circumstantial, depending upon 
political conditions and styles, not on substantive differences. 
THE RELEVANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In almost all incidents of state-sponsored terrori sm a major common denomi-
nator has been the tendency of the sponsors to avoid responsibility.26 Stephen 
Segaller's neologism "invisible armies" provides an accurate reflection of this 
trait.27 The well-disclosed secret of government ties with terrorists and occasionally 
also direct governmental control of terrorist assaults, have been constantly denied 
by the authorities of the states involved. 
The Soviet Union has made it extremely difficult (and hence dubious) to 
trace any direct and clear-cut links between its state organs and terrorists. Still, 
many have pointed to such connections during the Lebanon War in 1982, and recent 
revelations from the collapsing security services in Eastern European countries 
have supported such allegations.28 The US has done its utmost to conceal involve-
ment in cases of murder and paramilitary intervention, in particular in Latin 
America. Middle Eastern countries — Libya, Syria, Iran, South Yemen and others 
— have never acknowledged their connections to terrorist assaults. Recent 
examples are Libya's denial of involvement and responsibility in the Pan Am 
bombing over Lockerbie in 1988 and the bombing of a French aircraft over West 
Africa in 1989;29 and Iran's denial of having played a role in the Israeli Embassy 
bombing in Buenos Aires in 1992.30 Also, it is impossible to conceive of the 
protracted captivity of the Western hostages in Syrian-controlled Lebanon — and 
their almost collective release — without suspecting Syrian connivance.31 
Governments share with terrorists many of the same reasons for resorting to 
terrorism. Where legal, political, economic or security constraints circumscribe 
direct access to the goal, terrorism often seems an adequate substitute, a "surrogate" 
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means. Terrorism has also been an additional strategy to either supplement for 
shortcomings, or improve the performance of certain policies. But whereas terrorist 
organizations have usually been prompt to claim responsibility — sometimes even 
rival claims for responsibility are voiced—governments have tended to hide behind 
a smoke screen. Certainly, terrorist organizations (or groups) depend on terrorism 
for publicity. Publicity is then used to vivify the political agenda and evade the risk 
of oblivion. Governments, on the contrary, do not need publicity. They will do their 
utmost to avoid publicity; anonymity permits them to by-pass responsibility and 
avoid accountability. And terrorism, which consists of clandestine violent acts, is 
perfectly tailored to satisfy this need. 
Undoubtedly, state-sponsored terrorism must be distinguished from other 
forms of (non-state) "private enterprise" or group terrorism. Thus, the conditions 
under which states opt for sponsoring terrorism (in war or peacetime) are important 
for clarifying which foreign policy category state-sponsored terrorism belongs to, 
either diplomacy or warfare. Such a distinction, however, requires a preliminary 
discussion of diplomacy and war. 
PROBLEMS DEFINING DIPLOMACY AND WAR 
Raymond Aron noted that the "ambiguity" in "international relations" is not 
to be imputed to the inadequacy of our concepts because it is an integral part of 
reality itself.32 The ambiguity involving the concept of state-sponsored terrorism as 
part of foreign policy is thus directly related to the elusive dichotomy between 
armed conflict and peace.33 It would therefore be wise to try to establish the 
distinction between diplomacy — the instrument of peaceful relations among states 
— and war prior to assessing the realm within which state-sponsored terrorism 
would best fit. 
Diplomacy 
According to Elmer Plischke, 
Everyone presumes to understand the meaning and nature of diplo-
macy; yet, even a random sampling of definitions produces a confus-
ing array of interpretations . . . . More precisely, diplomacy has been 
described as 'a first line of defense' or as 'both the art and the science 
by which each state attempts to achieve success in its foreign policy 
short of forcing conclusions by armed conflict' and in this sense it 
'may be said to stop where war begins, and it starts where war ends.'34 
In maintaining that diplomacy is too evasive a concept and possesses a 
variety of operational meanings resulting in a logical and functional confusion, 
James Der Derian circumvents the task of definition and proposes instead to adopt 
the 'genealogical' approach of interpretative history.35 He is not alone in this 
contention. In a similar vein, Harold Nicolson draws attention to the transformation 
of diplomacy and its changing nature.36 Thus, the historical demarcation lines 
serving as yardsticks for the typology of diplomacy may be instructive in illuminat-
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ing the relationship between diplomacy and violence, including contemporary 
diplomacy and contemporary state-sponsored terrorism. According to Nicolson, 
the ordinary citizen expects violence to be restrained by reason despite reality's 
teachings that violence can be restrained only by force. Moreover, this realist and 
structuralist interpretation sees force as controllable only under conditions charac-
teristic of the old systems of authority (Balance of Power, Concert of Europe, 
discipline of the Great Powers). Therefore, with the demise of the old system, a 
method introducing instability was brought into play. Nicolson explains much of 
the "evil" of instability as being caused by the theory that all states are equal.37 And 
indeed, state-sponsored terrorism has illustrated that in the modern international 
system equality prevails not only philosophically, nor simply as a token in the fora 
of international and transnational organizations. To be sure, the ability to manipu-
late foreign relations with a minimum of resources has introduced a new dimension 
into the relationship between violence and diplomacy.38 
The meaning of diplomacy — the "art of international relations"—becomes 
more complex with the entanglement of inherited old and modern tasks. From a 
functionalist perspective, these tasks are designed to fulfil the main raison d'être 
of diplomacy, which is persuasion via peaceful communication,39 and conse-
quently, the instruments of diplomacy become no less important in the definition 
than the tasks. For Kal Holsti communication, and the role of diplomatic bargaining 
as a mode of communication, are central to diplomacy.40 Bargaining is, according 
Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, "not only . . . a technique in its own right, but it is 
an instrument by which the other techniques used may ultimately target states."41 It 
is suggested here that state-sponsored terrorism be considered such a technique. 
Evidently, diplomacy involves not only the primary parties to the dialogue, 
but third parties as well. Diplomacy is used to influence one party by influencing 
other parties regardless of whether they are already related to each other or could 
become so pursuant to the diplomatic intervention. Thus, as a bargaining technique 
state-sponsored terrorism may be used not only to achieve a specific goal but to 
stimulate diplomacy itself, a means of diplomacy aimed at generating further 
diplomacy. 
This line of reasoning, acknowledging that under certain circumstances 
state-sponsored terrorism is a means of diplomacy, is still academically and 
politically unpopular. State-sponsored terrorism has traditionally been referred to 
as a kind of warfare, and understandably so because of its violent component. Yet, 
war is no less elusive a concept than diplomacy, and a mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive definition to justify the inference from war has not yet been agreed upon 
either. However, in order to avoid putting the cart before the horse, i.e. elaborating 
on the relationship between state-sponsored terrorism and diplomacy, a short 
discussion of war and the relationship between state-sponsored terrorism and war 




A 'genealogical' approach is of assistance here too, for throughout history 
war has changed its nature significantly. Cicero emphasized the "violent contest" 
of war; Grotius focused on its legality, perceiving war as a legal situation permitting 
rival parties to conduct a confrontation by means of armed force; and Clausewitz 
understood war as being the unrestrained use of violence in relations among states. 
War has largely been envisaged as an interaction taking place among sovereign 
states and involving confrontation between the regular armies of these states only. 
Yet the historical evolution of violent human conflict has witnessed the introduction 
of new methods into, and the inclusion of old ones formerly excluded from, the 
category of armed conflict.42 They include guerrilla warfare, nuclear warfare, 
terrorism, and so on. 
Guerrilla warfare, for instance, does not fall easily within the realm of the 
traditional definitions of war43 since it does not always take place between sovereign 
states. In some cases, such as Vietnam and Central America, it attains a significant 
international dimension due to super-power intervention in the internal affairs of 
these states. In other cases, however, such as the pre-Gulf War Kurdish struggle and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, guerrilla wars only secondarily touch on the foreign policy 
level of international politics. Indeed, in recent modern history guerrilla war has 
been frequently fought by insurgent and irregular armies against the regular army 
and other law-and-order authorities of the state. In this sense, it was defined as 
domestic war, usually part of a revolutionary struggle in the course of which terrorist 
methods have often been applied. 
As the concept of war was stretched to include internal war, and as it was 
redefined to represent a broader category of armed conflict, locating terrorism and 
state-sponsored terrorism has become ever more complex. State-sponsored terror-
ism applies tactics typical of internal war to the setting of international relations. 
The fact that those techniques are based on violence and are war-like in nature has 
led many commentators to move from internal war to international war (by means 
of the "low-intensity" qualifier and the "surrogate" characteristic) rather than relate 
it to diplomacy and bargaining. And pressured by counter terrorism considerations 
a common suggestion was perpetuated that to counteract terrorism the target state 
must treat the threat as a form of war.44 
WAR AND DIPLOMACY, AND STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM 
Borrowing from Eckstein's observation about internal war,45 it is safe to say 
that state sponsored terrorism is a "synthetic" subject of social science. Therefore, 
it comes as no surprise that the attempt to define state-sponsored terrorism uni-
dimensionally as primarily an armed conflict poses an intricate dilemma. Brian 
Jenkins, a leading representative of the dominant approach that views state-
sponsored terrorism as a form of low-intensity warfare, contends that "international 
terrorism" is the label given to a low-level, world-wide war waged by many groups 
espousing different causes against many nations.46 He also sees in governments' 
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sponsorship of terrorism a continuation of a local armed conflict, or a mode of 
surrogate warfare against a foreign foe.47 Allan Gerson reinforces Jenkins' attitude 
but whereas Jenkins takes the perspective of the targeted state, Gerson explains 
state-sponsored terrorism from the angle of the terrorist who attempts to "legitimize 
the selective use of terrorism as an acceptable means of warfare."48 
Interestingly, while included within the category of armed conflict, and 
while the threat of terrorism has been dealt with in terms of outcomes that could 
parallel the results of war (i.e. the element of reciprocity),49 there appears to be an 
underlying assumption that states opt for terrorism as a foreign policy means to by-
pass conventional war in order to avoid the costliness thereof and the potential 
escalation into conventional or nuclear conflict. Thus, such outcome is a priori 
ruled out in the theorem. For instance, in the case of hostage-taking and hijacking 
by state-sponsored terrorists, governments which initiate the event and deliberately 
deny their involvement, also exploit it politically by offering their diplomatic 
services to bring the matter to an end and in the expectation of political rewards.50 
The point about the incompleteness and self-contradictory nature of the war 
paradigm of state-sponsored terrorism can be further elaborated. For instance, 
Jenkins' premise that state-sponsored terrorism is "surrogate warfare" is under-
mined even by his own statement that "war will cease to be finite, the distinction 
between peace and war will dissolve."51 If so, why not consider state-sponsored 
terrorism as technique that could be termed "surrogate diplomacy" instead of 
"surrogate war"? Geoffrey Blainey' s statement that ".. . the outbreak of war and the 
outbreak of peace are essentially decisions to implement aims by new means. To 
attempt to explain war is to attempt to explain why forceful means were selected"52 
is valuable here. In the same vein it can be argued that attempting to explain state-
sponsored terrorism amounts to attempting to explain why less yet still forceful 
means were selected. It is to attempt to explain why state-sponsored terrorism is a 
form of subversion that sometimes ranks closely to diplomacy and at other times is 
closer to war. 
Finally, it should be stressed that state-sponsored terrorism as "surrogate 
warfare" dominates the discourse about the various threats directed against diplo-
macy. Terrorism that targets diplomats imposes physical threats on diplomats, and 
threatens to confound diplomatic relations among states. It thereby puts the whole 
institution of diplomacy in jeopardy, and must therefore be studied in conjunction 
with the techniques of diplomacy.53 
TERRORIST DIPLOMACY 
Unlike the Report of the Committee, for instance, which sees diplomacy as 
an effective countermeasure or sanction to an activity occasionally amounting to 
(low intensity) warfare, the argument put forward here suggests looking at the 
activity to be countered as a means of diplomacy itself. Andrew Selth draws 
attention to the wide range of opportunities and options open to different actors — 
non-state actors and small states alike, allowing them to act independently of the 
16 
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major blocs (in the bi-polar system), and of the most powerful states.54 Stephen 
Segaller talks about modern terrorism as 
the 'equalizer' which put every man on the same basis. For states, 
terrorism can do the same thing — it can even up the odds between a 
major power and a small one, when neither will go to war, but the 
weaker wishes to provoke or destabilize." 
Continuing in a similar vein are Stohl's argument that terrorism has become part of 
'coercive diplomacy'56 as well as elements of the "diplomacy of violence" in the 
jargon of the Realist School.57 Nevertheless, as Paul Lauren rightly stresses, the 
potential to hurt traditionally has been perceived mainly in the form of military 
strength and physical harm. 
The point here is, that in the case of state-sponsored terrorism the corollary 
of incentives or inducements as well as inhibitions (as formulated in the theories of 
coercive diplomacy and deterrence) is precisely in the ability to inflict psychologi-
cal harm. Such effect may propel other outcomes (for instance, demoralization 
leading to destabilization of the economy and the regime as already experienced in 
France and Britain and to a certain extent in Germany), which may prove effective 
in persuading or compelling the target actor to either stop performing a certain 
activity, undo what has already been done, or embark on a new political path. 
Thomas Shelling's assertion that to be coercive violence has to be anticipated, and 
that it has to be avoidable by accommodation,58 suits perfectly the diplomatic use 
of state-sponsored terrorism with the only reservation that it is not violence itself 
that is feared but rather its psychological repercussions. Moreover, in the case of 
state-sponsored terrorism: the range may vary from a threat communicated clearly 
and, therefore credibly to the subtle and intangible insinuation about using the 
terrorist option. I would argue that the feasibility of uttering such a threat is so 
strong, that even in the absence of an explicit threat, alone the thought of it may be 
sufficient to deter.59 
To be sure, Der Derian' s explanation of the changing character of diplomacy 
as being a form of alienation,60 provides grounds for perceiving state-sponsored 
terrorism precisely as a diplomatic tactic. Referring to Lauren's insight is also 
extremely instructive here: 
A recognition of [these] gradual and differentiated measures may 
encourage more sophisticated theories of deterrence and coercion to 
consider the possibilities of a more flexible, careful, and specific 
tailoring of threats to fit the unique configurations of each bargaining 
situation, rather than an automatic and exclusive reliance upon 
military might. Such refined distinctions may become increasingly 
important, for as armed force becomes less and less usable, other 
kinds of threatened sanctions become all the more critical.6' 
In the relationship between post-industrialized Western countries and Third 
World states, and with regard to the past bi-polar context of world politics, state-
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sponsored terrorism may well reflect a change in the rules of diplomacy. The 
estrangement of decolonized people from the world of past colonizers, and the 
latters' attempt to continue shaping the rules of the political-international game as 
well as the changed general attitude to warfare, are crucial to understanding the new 
role of terrorism. Movements of national liberation (not states) have constantly 
attempted — and to a great extent succeeded — to remove terrorism from the realm 
of unconventional, illegitimate and illegal warfare.62 By the same token, state-
sponsored terrorism could be seen as an unconscious attempt to redefine the norms 
of diplomacy. 
The intention of states sponsoring terrorism, the reaction of states targeted 
and the interaction that ensues make terrorism exploitable by either side as a tool 
of diplomacy. The linkage between releasing Western hostages held in Lebanon by 
the Hezbollah and the renewal of diplomatic relations (Syria and the UK, France and 
Germany), or the lifting of economic sanctions (Syria and the US), or just the 
improvement of the political atmosphere (Iran and the West), are typical examples 
of the diplomatic significance of state-sponsored terrorism.63 
In fact, state-sponsored terrorism has up to now seldom evolved into an 
armed conflict between states — the sponsors and the targeted states. The Lebanon 
War of 1982, for which state sponsorship (or, at least, state connivance with 
terrorism) has served as a pretext to enter into war is such an example, as well as the 
US attack on Libya, which however did not develop into a war.64 Thus, while 
separatist-nationalist terrorism may draw a country into civil war, state-sponsored 
terrorism has not resulted in international war between states,65 but has remained in 
the realm of diplomacy. 
The use of terrorist diplomacy as illustrated by Iraq's policy during the 1990-
91 Gulf crisis is a case in point. On this occasion Iraq had recourse to two bargaining 
techniques, namely state-sponsored terrorism and direct state terrorism. Unlike the 
Iranian government, which in 1980 still felt compelled to hide behind the facade of 
"uncontrollable students" seizing the American Embassy in Teheran, Saddam 
Hussein appeared free of any similar inhibitions and did not shy away from meeting 
publicly with the foreigners he took as hostages in order to extort concessions from 
the coalition formed against him. During the crisis Iraq diverted an aircraft 
refuelling in occupied Kuwait and took the passengers as hostages. In addition, they 
announced that as many as 10,000 Americans and other foreign nationals trapped 
in Iraq and Kuwait would be kept for an undetermined term as involuntary "guests." 
They were moved to Iraqi military bases and other strategic installations to shield 
these areas in the event of a coalition attack. Furthermore, using the hostage-taking 
as theatre Saddam Hussein orchestrated the stages of negotiations towards the 
gradual release of hostages as a means of steering Iraq's contacts with the 
governments concerned. 
Certainly, Iraq thus tried to use the "multi-national hostage-taking" as a 
coercive technique of diplomacy to politically divide its enemies. The targeted 
governments first responded by diplomatic routes rather than violent confrontation: 
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delegations were sent to Iraq to negotiate the release of the hostages, and member 
states of the anti-Iraq coalition ordered surveillance of foreigners and deportation 
of Iraqi nationals including diplomats. Clearly, preference for precautionary 
measures over retaliatory ones was manifest in order to prevent terrorism. Having 
failed to produce the desired political results (possibly due to Iraqi miscalculations 
concerning the coalition's determination not to back off from their insistence on 
Iraqi withdrawal and its members' resolute stance against terrorist blackmail), 
Saddam Hussein resorted to other diplomatic and conciliatory moves. One of these 
consisted of a declaration explaining the release of the hostages as a gesture to 
encourage diplomatic efforts to avert war.66 And, as if to validate the diplomatic 
nature of this friction, the hesitations preceding the change in American rhetoric 
suggest that the US itself was not convinced that warfare was the correct definition 
of the situation. In addition, Saddam Hussein openly announced the use of terrorism 
by Iraq's agents and surrogates overseas.67 This was substantiated by a number of 
terrorist assaults that occurred at the time. It was also supported by the serious 
emergency declared in Western countries and the scrutinizing of Iraqi nationals and 
immigrants, particularly in the US, Canada and Britain.68 
Both versions of state-sponsored terrorism were initiated prior to the coali-
tion's attack on Iraq, i.e. before the war but during the period of the UN's ultimatum 
to Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. Thus, it serves as an indubitable case-
study for terrorism employed both as diplomacy and transformed (albeit not for the 
tactic of hostage-taking in this particular case) into an instrument of warfare during 
the period of the armed conflict. It appears to have affected targeted states in their 
later dealings with state-sponsored terrorism as displayed in the stand taken by the 
US, Britain and France concerning the prosecution of the Libyan terrorists accused 
of the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 and the French airliner. This transformation 
was further reinforced by their success in harnessing the UN to the efforts, and 
imposing a UN members' air traffic embargo on Libya.69 
CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to bring forth the proposition that state-sponsored 
terrorism could, and under certain circumstances should be discussed as a means of 
diplomacy. It is a special form of diplomacy, perhaps "terrorist diplomacy," 
consisting of elements of deterrence and coercion, and backed by violent means. It 
suggests the possibility that a new diplomatic regime is evolving in which limited 
political violence becomes at least tolerable, if not acquiring a degree of legitimacy 
as an instrument of diplomacy. 
In a world that raises the banner of peaceful settlement of disputes, perceiv-
ing state-sponsored terrorism as a tool of diplomatic bargaining in conflict manage-
ment and resolution appears no less plausible an approach than the traditional low-
intensity war school's. Certainly, this does not exclude the possibility of state-
sponsored terrorism being at times a form of surrogate war, or even of war itself. But 
negating the diplomatic quality of state-sponsored terrorism equals shutting one's 
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eyes to a valid possibility that allows for a refined understanding and a more 
delicate distinction of the alternatives for state activity along the continuum of peace 
and war. 
Endnotes 
* Prepared for the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies Annual Meeting, 
Carleton University, Ottawa, 5-6 June 1993. This is a revised version of a previous paper for which 
research was funded by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. I am gratefully 
acknowledging the helpful comments on the earlier draft by David Charters, John F. Murphy, 
Jeffrey I. Ross, Mark Glouberman and the anonymous readers. I would like to thank Marketa 
Cozman and Adam White for research assistance. 
1. Harold Nicolson, "Transition from the Old to the New Diplomacy," in Elmer Plischke, ed., Modem 
Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1979), p. 53. 
2. With this contention I am joining a very small minority of commentators, notably Andrew Selth 
and Michael Stohl, who made similar propositions, but with different emphasis, and which will be 
discussed later. 
3. Harry Eckstein, "Introduction: Toward the Theoretical Study of Internal War," in Harry Eckstein, 
ed., Internal War (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1962), pp. 10, 14-15, 20. 
4. Attempting to classify and generalize about terrorism resembles walking on a mine field: 
exceptions and diverging interpretations are abundant, so much so that a colleague once suggested 
to me that terrorism as a topic did not lend itself to academic inquiry. 
5. See, Andrew Selth, Against Every Human Law: The Terrorist Threat to Diplomacy (Rushcutters 
Bay, NSW: Australian National University Press, 1988), pp. 36-42, on Libyan and Syrian state 
sponsored terrorism. 
6. State-terrorism as a means of domestic affairs is defined as the application of violent and 
terrorizing methods on behalf of the government against its indigenous population or certain 
sectors within it. 
7. Except for two states, Israel and theUS,thishas been the attitude developed by most of the affected 
governments. 
8. Keith Highet was President of the American Society of International Law in 1986. The American 
Society of International Law, Report of the Committee on the Responses to State-Sponsored 
Terrorism (Washington DC, September 1990), Appendix B, p. 4. Hereafter cited as Report of 
Committee. 
9. See, Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977); Report of Committee; 
Andrew Selth, "Terrorist Studies and the Threat to Diplomacy," Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology, 19 (1986), pp. 114-19, to name but two. See also, the terrorism 
conventions of the ICAO 1963 1970 1971 and the 1988 Montreal Protocol, the Council of Europe 
1977, the OAS 1971, and the UN conventions 1973 and 1979 and 1988. This old debate will not 
be reproduced here. Suffice it to say that the inability to define terrorism has not discouraged 
academic study. In fact, similar problems have arisen with respect to the definition of other subjects 
such as ethnicity, nationalism, religion and even business. In earlier writings I have contended with 
a typology of common characteristics of terrorism studied from four aspects — motivation, 
intention, strategy and tactics — which provides a workable tool for identifying what can and 
cannot be considered as terrorism. Noemi Gal-Or, International Cooperation to Suppress 
Terrorism (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 3-7. 
10. Terrorism, which is a political phenomenon, is open to a selection of interpretations depending on 
the particular point of view of the definer. Consequently, the terrorism vocabulary is abundant with 
qualifying terms — individual terrorism, political violence, state terrorism, environmental terror-
ism and cultural terrorism (to name only a few) — which are not mutually exclusive. Thus, the 
boundaries between what should and should not be referred to as state-sponsored terrorism are very 
20 
Conflict Quarterly 
subtle. Moreover, any such distinction is bound to be somewhat arbitrary, and only partly 
theoretical, for terrorism touches upon two subjective elements: it derives from the root of terror, 
which is a psychological notion and is therefore of a highly subjective quality; and it targets — 
innocent victims — thus raising moral connotations. Do Libyan hit-men assassinating Qaddafi's 
rivals abroad engage in state-sponsored terrorism? Who do they terrorize? Is it the direct victims 
involved only? Is it the Libyan public? What about affected passers-by from the public of the 
foreign state? 
The state, which theoretically possesses the monopoly over force and various forms of violence, 
is also capable of instilling terror and targeting innocents. But does sharing these attributes render 
any violence by the state into terrorism? Does any kind of state-orchestrated violence fit within the 
category of state-sponsored terrorism? Clearly, these questions relate to the various components 
of terrorism: the initiators and operators, the targets, the tools and the techniques, and the location 
of the acts. Yet, in the absence of fixed correlations it becomes almost impossible to develop 
definitions for the different types of terrorism. 
11. Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental 
Violence and Repression (Westport: Greenwood, 1984). 
12. Selth focuses on the relationship between state-sponsored terrorism and diplomacy with a special 
emphasis on the concerns of diplomats. 
For the purpose of this study, the problem of state involvement in terrorist activities can 
be approached at three levels. The first level is that at which encouragement — either 
active or passive -is given by governments to groups or mobs which threaten diplomats 
and diplomatic facilities within their own national boundaries. The second level is that 
of support — either direct or indirect — by governments for so-called 'independent' 
terrorists operating in other states, while the third is that at which states actually conduct 
terrorist operations themselves, either using their own operatives or by enlisting 
terrorist groups directly to act on their behalf. All three constitute a significant 
challenge to the normal processes of interstate contact and pose a growing threat to 
diplomats and diplomatic facilities. 
Selth, Against Every Human Law, p. 32. 
13. Stohl and Lopez, The State as Terrorist, p. 7. 
14. Quoted in Ibid., p. 7. 
15. George Lopez goes into great detail in portraying governments as terrorists due to their use of a 
battery of violent means. 
I employ the most basic tool of social science investigation, the development of a 
taxonomy with citation of appropriate empirical referents, to begin to delineate what 
for so long has evaded our enquiry: styles of rule in which the attachment of electronic 
devices to human sexual organs during questioning; detention without statement of 
charges of or promise of trial; and the rape, murder, and mutilation of 'undesirable' 
citizens have become standard political practice. In so doing, I examine a complex 
array of factors descriptive of and associated with the dynamic of state terror. 
Stohl and Lopez, The State as Terrorist, p. 59. For the purpose of analytic clarity I would prefer 
to characterize this list as belonging to the category of state terror and not state terrorism which 
differs in the means applied. Both methods of intimidation and coercion, which come here under 
the label of "state," are directed primarily at the domestic audience. 
16. Ibid., p. 44. 
17. Ibid. 
18. T. David Mason and Dale A. Krane, "The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory 
of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror," International Studies Quarterly, 33 (1989), p. 178. 
19. Loch K. Johnson, "Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America's Secret 
Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, 33 (1989), p. 81. 
20. These, in fact, parallel the four categories of foreign policy, i.e. propaganda, diplomacy, economic 
measures and military intervention. 
21 
Summer 1993 
21. Johnson, "Covert Action and Accountability," p. 86. 
22. Report of Committee, p. 14. 
23. See also the very enlightening classification of Edward F. Mickolus, "What Constitutes State 
Support of Terrorism?," Terrorism and Political Violence, 1, no. 3 ( 1989), pp. 287-93. 
24. Report of Committee, pp. 12-13. 
25. Murphy contends that terrorism is simply not a viable concept for imposing criminal penalties or 
for structuring ways to prevent criminal activities. See, John F. Murphy, State Support of 
International Terrorism (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989). 
26. A conspicuous exception to the rule has been Iraq's threat of using terrorism as a supplementary 
measure to win the recent Gulf War. Selth points to an earlier position taken by Libya's leader who 
expressed an attitude favorable to terrorism without, however, admitting responsibility for any 
specific terrorist activity. See, Selth, Against Every Human Law p. 38. 
27. Stephen Segaller, Invisible Armies. Terrorism into the 1990s (London: Michael Joseph, 1986). 
28. For the Lebanon War, see Eliezer Ben Rafael, Israel-Palestine: A Guerrilla Conflict in Interna-
tional Politics (Westport: Greenwood, 1987); and for recent unravellings see reprint from Le 
Nouvel Observateur in Haaretz 10 August 1990; The New York Times, 28 March 1991. 
29. The New York Times, 24 and 25 March 1992; 3, 4 and 18 April 1992. 
30. This accusation was brought by the US and was supported by the fact that a radical Lebanese Shiite 
Muslim faction, Islamic Holy War, known for maintaining close ties with the Iranian government, 
has declared responsibility. The New York Times, 24 March 1992 and 10 May 1992. 
31. The New York Times 19 and 21 November 1991. 
32. James Der Derian, On Diplomacy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 14; and Raymond Aron, 
Peace and Power: A Theory of International Relations,trans .by R. Howard and A.B. Fox (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966). 
33. In Geoffrey Blainey's words "war and peace are more than opposites. They have so much in 
common that neither can be understood without the other," in Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War 
(New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 245. 
34. Elmer Plischke, "Diplomacy — Search for Its Meaning," in Plischke, ed., Modern Diplomacy, 
p. 27. 
35. Der Derian, On Diplomacy, pp. 31-32. 
36. See Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 43-53. 
37. He focuses on the openness of democratic diplomacy and the direct method of modern foreign 
policy which make classical diplomacy almost redundant, and above all instill uncertainty within 
the system. 
38. This issue will be further elaborated when discussing coercive diplomacy. 
39. Armed conflict is also aform of communication, albeit not peaceful, and "by other means," as noted 
by von Clausewitz in his famous maxim. 
40. Kal J. Holsti, International Politics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988). 
41. Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1989), p. 157. 
42. A term used to indicate the extension of the concept of war beyond its traditional meaning. 
43. It does so during inter-state war. World War II partisans are an example. See also, Protocol I to 
the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Status and Rights of Prisoners of War 1977. 
44. Donald J. Hanle, Terrorism: The Newest Form of Warfare (Toronto: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989). 
45. Eckstein, Internal War, p. 12. 
46. Brian Jenkins, Diplomats on the Front Line (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Collection, 1982), p. 1. 
47. Ibid., p. 10. 
48. Allan, Gerson, 'Terrorism and Turtle Bay," The National Interest, 11 (1988), p. 95. 
22 
Conflict Quarterly 
49. Indeed, despite preferring the peaceful course, the US has not abstained from resorting to force. For 
example, they twice attacked Libya in 1986. Israel has made it part of its policy to retaliate 
militarily and to strike preemptively at various terrorist bases, particularly in the early 1970s in 
Jordan and since then in Lebanon. 
50. An example is Syria's role in the release of the Western hostages held in Lebanon in 1992. 
51. Cited in Selth, Against Every Human Law, p. 43. 
52. Blainey, The Causes of War, p. 248. 
53. Even the Committee on Responses to State-Sponsored Terrorism which has implied and equated 
state-sponsored terrorism with warlike activity, prefers recourse to diplomacy as a means of dispute 
settlement. In its conclusions the Committee states: 
Turning to possible responses to state supported or sponsored terrorism, it is important 
to note that diplomacy is an extremely important, arguably the most important, method 
for dealing with the problem. 
Report of Committee, p. 57. 
54. Selth, Against Every Human Law, p. 48. 
55. Segaller, Invisible Armies, pp. 147-148. 
56. Michael Stohl, "National Interest and State Terrorism in International Affairs," Political Science, 
36(1984), pp. 41-42. 
57. See, Selth, Against Every Human Law, p. 42, who mainly refers to Thomas Shelling, and Paul 
Gordon Lauren, "Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Diplo-
macy," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 183-211. 
58. Thomas Shelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 2. 
59. It could be argued that Western European countries are reluctant to intervene in the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia fearing terrorist reprisal, among other reasons. If this is true, state-sponsored 
terrorism here is experienced as deterrence rather than coercive diplomacy. 
60. DerDerian, On Diplomacy, p. 6. 
61. Lauren, "Theories of Bargaining," p. 22. 
62. Gal-Or, International Cooperation to Suppress Terrorism. See, Protocol I, the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions on the Status and Rights of Prisoners of War, Art. 1(40) 1977. 
63. As far as the US is concerned, it is interesting to note that not only has Assad denied any link to 
the anti-US terrorist actions (and claimed that Syria itself has been a victim of terrorism), but he 
has also on several occasions successfully obtained credit in the US for helping in the release of 
the American hostages kidnapped by Shiite groups associated with him. Moshe Ma' oz, "State-Run 
Terrorism in the Middle East: The Case of Syria," Middle East Review, 19, no. 3 (1987), p. 13. 
64. To be sure, it could be argued that from 1981 to 1987, the US and Libya were engaged in a kind 
of low-intensity undeclared war, the 1986 air raid being only its most dramatic manifestation. Yet, 
such a line of argumentation only emphasizes the difficulty in demarcating the line between war 
and diplomacy, which after all, are pursued simultaneously. 
65. That is, states not already part of war. 
66. The New York Times, 7 December 1991. 
67. Haaretz, 10 October 1990; Deutschland Berichte, November 1990. 
68. See, The New York Times, 27 May 1991, about US containment of a terrorist assault on 4 February 
1991 in Jidda. The New York Times, 20 October 1991, reporting that President Bush hoped that 
diplomacy would solve the Persian Gulf crisis, including the hostage taking; for reports on scrutiny 
of Iraqis in the US, see The New York Times, 8 January 1991; on the absence of reaction to the 
bombing of the United Kingdom, Italian and Soviet embassies in Teheran, see The Vancouver Sun, 
21 February 1991 ; and the on overall Western forebearant response, The New York Times, 4 March 
1991. 
69. The New York Times, 16 April 1992. 
23 
